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a b s t r a c t
This paper introduces a general framework for dealing with dynamic inconsistency in the context of
Markov decision problems. It decouples and examines concepts that are often entwined in the literature.
It distinguishes between the decision maker and her various temporal selves, and between the beliefs
and intentions of the selves. The creation of a unified formalism to deal with dynamic inconsistency
allows for the introduction of a hybrid decision maker, who is naive sometimes, sophisticated at others.
Such a hybrid decision maker can be used to model situations where type determination is endogenous.
Interestingly, the analysis of hybrid types indicates that self-deception can be optimal.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Imagine that you are sitting with friends, drinking beer. You
have just finished your second pint, and your friends want to order
another round. You think to yourself: ‘well, I could deal with one
or two more, but then I really should go home’. However, you are
also acutely aware from previous experience that after your third
pint your mindset is likely to change: you will start fooling your-
self, repeating over and over in the course of the evening: ‘just one
more beer, and then I am really going home’. This would lead to
an undesirable outcome, getting drunk and having a hangover the
next morning. So you wisely leave your friends after just your sec-
ondbeer.What is happeninghere? The framework thatwepropose
here makes it possible to model this and similar scenarios.1
Traditionally, there are three main ways to portray decision
makers under time inconsistency. The first one regards decision
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: mederzsombor@gmail.com (Z.Z. Méder),
j.flesch@maastrichtuniversity.nl (J. Flesch), r.peeters@maastrichtuniversity.nl
(R. Peeters).
1 The model of this situation is presented in Section 7.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.02.002
0165-4896/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.makers as naifs (Akerlof, 1991; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999b),
the second attributes sophistication to them (Laibson, 1997; Fis-
cher, 1999; Harris and Laibson, 2001), while the third argues that
even resolute behavior is possible (McClennen, 1990). A common
assumption of these models in the classic papers on dynamic in-
consistency is regarding the decision maker as falling entirely into
one of the above three categories, treating her type as exogenously
given. More recently, mainly building on the work of O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001), hybrid decision makers have been considered,
in models of so-called ‘partial naiveté’. However, thesemodels still
treat this type as exogenous to the decision problem.
Oneway to interpret our example above is that you are sophisti-
cated after finishing the first two beers, but as you drink more, you
expect to become naive later on. The story indicates that in certain
situations, a decisionmaker could cause her type to change; more-
over, she might even be able to reason about such changes. Any
perspective that assumes a fixed type is unable to capture such
situations. In order to fix this shortcoming, we attempt a general
interpretation of naiveté and sophistication for dynamic inconsis-
tency. The language we develop allows the introduction of hybrid-
type decision makers such as the one in our example.
Following the review of the relevant literature, we build
a formalism that allows for precise definitions of the two
Z.Z. Méder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 87 (2017) 40–54 41most commonly discussed types of decision makers, naifs and
sophisticates. We work in discrete time, assuming that the
situation of the decision maker can be captured as a Markov
decision problem.We distinguish between the level of the decision
maker and her multiple selves. Starting on the level of the selves,
we specify both the intentions and the beliefs of each self. Next, the
properties of these intention–belief pairs (coherence, stationarity,
consistency) are discussed. Moving to the level of the decision
maker (i.e., the collection of all selves), we define the concept
of a frame, and consider its properties. We link the properties of
intention–belief pairs to the properties of frames. The concept of a
frame is novel. A frame provides all the relevant information about
a decision maker facing dynamic inconsistency.
After clarifying our assumptions on utility functions, we define
and introduce the two types of decision making, naiveté and
sophistication. We provide existence results for optimal frames
of both types, and discuss various properties of such frames. In
the main text body, we then introduce decision makers with a
hybrid type, also providing an existence theorem, and discuss two
examples of hybrid decision making in detail. In the concluding
section, we point towards further extensions of the model.
The contributions of this paper are thus threefold. First, it
provides new concepts and distinctions for problems of dynamic
inconsistency. In particular, the representation of the decision
maker through a frame, and the theorems relating consistency and
stationarity could prove useful (Section 3.6). Second, it provides
definitions for naiveté and sophistication, and shows the existence
of naively and sophisticatedly optimal frames. Third, it introduces
hybrid naive-sophisticated types, expanding the scope of dynamic
inconsistency models. As a corollary, the analysis of hybrid types
shows that self-deception can be optimal.
2. Related literature
Modeling approaches to dynamic inconsistency come in two
varieties (Asheim, 2007). Dual-self planner–doer models bear
a close analogy to principal–agent models (Thaler and Shefrin,
1981). A (single) planner, endowed with dynamically consistent
preferences formulates plans; a present-biased doer can execute
them or deviate from them. The conceptual background of
planner–doer models is multifold: They sometimes rely on the
hot–cold empathy gap (Loewenstein, 2005), on recent findings of
neuroscience, or even the Freudian distinction between the id and
the ego. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) argue in favor of a dual-
self model as being analytically simpler, more in line with findings
in neuroscience, and nevertheless being able to explain a large
number of empirical phenomena. A key advantage of this approach
is that welfare comparisons are relatively straightforward: The
preferences of the planner are generally adopted to be normatively
relevant. Recent models allow for the planner to learn about the
doer’s type through costly experimentation (Ali, 2011), or can
include self-control (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Benabou and
Pycia, 2002; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012).
An important limitation of many dual-self models is that they
assume that individuals have long-run, time-consistent prefer-
ences (e.g., Benabou and Pycia, 2002; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006;
Brocas and Carrillo, 2008). In this paper we avoid this assumption,
and instead adopt the multiple-self approach.2 Our primary focus
is on naive and sophisticated decision makers, and hybrid types.
Multiple-self models have analyzed naive and sophisticated deci-
sion makers in a variety of settings. For instance, Laibson (1994),
Fischer (1999), Laibson (1997) and Angeletos et al. (2001) work
2 Bach and Heilmann (2011) link multiple-self models to the philosophical
literature on personal identity.with sophisticates, while Akerlof (1991) and O’Donoghue and Ra-
bin (1999b) assume naiveté. In a general equilibrium setting, Her-
ings and Rohde (2006) and Herings and Rohde (2008) deal with
both naifs and sophisticates. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) is a
cardinal paper, as it compares and contrasts naiveté and sophisti-
cation for the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, with so-called
immediate costs and rewards.
The first model of hybrid types can be found in O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2001). They use quasi-hyperbolic (β −δ) discounting to de-
fine partial naiveté. While naifs think their β is 1, the actual β is
fully known to sophisticates, while partially naifs think they have
a β that is larger than their actual one. Partially naifs thus enter-
tain false beliefs about the future (just like naifs). This approach
has proven its fruitfulness especially in the contract design litera-
ture (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006;
Gilpatric, 2008);while DellaVigna andMalmendier (2006) focus on
a monopolistic firm facing a mixed population of consumers. Hei-
dhues and Kőszegi (2009) work with partial naifs who are ‘weakly
optimistic’ regarding their future present-biasedness.
A significant result of the O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001)
approach is that – compared to sophistication – any degree of
partial naiveté can generate arbitrarily large losses in efficiency for
the decision maker. In this sense, the limit of partial naiveté (as
the perceived present-biasedness approaches the real parameter)
is not sophistication.
There exist a few other attempts to analyze hybrid decision
making in the literature. In Asheim (2007), selves have a perceived
preference persistence, i.e., a probability (between 0 and 1)
with which they think their preferences will be identical in the
next period. However, this belief is always incorrect, as their
preferences will change with probability 1. In Jehiel and Lilico
(2010), selves endowed with exponential discounting have access
to information about a number of future periods (‘foresight’).
They find that improving the length of foresight always improves
welfare.
Hybrid decision making in our paper bears a resemblance to
the model of Bernheim and Rangel (2004). They analyze addictive
behavior by distinguishing between a ‘cold’ (sophisticated) and a
‘hot’ decision making mode (where preferences and choice may
diverge). In the cold mode, the decision maker is able to reason
about what her future behavior will be in either mode. This is
similar in spirit to how we treat sophisticated selves in hybrid
decision making in Section 7. The main difference between their
work and ours is in the treatment of naiveté. For Bernheim and
Rangel (2004), use of the addictive substance in the hot mode is
not a matter of deliberation and choice, but is instead a ‘mistake’
triggered by environmental cues. Thus, being in the hot mode
already determines the behavior of the decision maker, and no
proper decision making takes place. In contrast, our naive selves
may have a number of choices available to them, and they are
able to reason about these choices and the future. Furthermore, in
the current work, naiveté is not necessarily disadvantageous for
the decision maker, and so the behavior it leads to need not be
evaluated as mistaken.
This paper expands on the existing literature by providing
the foundations of a hybrid model that is independent of the
quasi-hyperbolic assumption ofO’Donoghue andRabin (2001), and
where type determination is an endogenous part of the decision
problem, as in our motivating example.
3. Basic concepts
In this section, we introduce our framework and notations.
Standard definitions are provided for the notions of ‘decision
problem’ and ‘history’. We then proceed by defining ‘intentions’
and ‘beliefs’ on the level of the selves, as well as ‘frame’, on the
level of the decision maker. Towards the end of the section, we
present some results on the relationship between consistency and
stationarity.
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We start with a decision maker facing a finite Markov decision
problem on an infinite horizon.3
Definition 1. A finite Markov decision problem is given by:
• the set of time periods T = {0, 1, 2, . . .};
• a finite set of states Ω , with ω0 ∈ Ω as the initial state;
• a finite and nonempty set of pure actions Aω that the decision
maker can choose from in state ω;
• a payoff function uω : Aω → R that assigns a payoff to every
action in state ω;
• transition probabilities mω : Aω → ∆(Ω), with mω

ω′|aω

denoting the probability to transit from stateω to stateω′ when
action aω is chosen.
Note that this definition excludes the possibility of randomization
over actions.
3.2. History
To capture all the informational aspects on which the choice of
an action can be conditioned, we introduce the notion of a history:
Definition 2. A history h has the form h =

ω0, aω0 , . . . , ωt−1,
aωt−1 , ωt

, with:
• ωi ∈ Ω , for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t};
• aωi ∈ Aωi , for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1};
• mωi

ωi+1|aωi

> 0, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}.
The current time at h is denoted by t = t(h), and the function
ω(h) = ωt(h) indicates the current state at history h. We use H
to refer to the set of all histories.
If history h′ begins with h, we say that h′ succeeds h, and denote
this with h′ ◃ h. The subset of H that consists of all histories that
succeed h is denoted by H◃h:
H◃h = {h′ ∈ H|h′ ◃ h}.
We refer to h0 = (ω0) as the ‘root history’. To shorten notation,
when specifying a history, we sometimes omit the commas
separating states and actions, and also the enclosing parentheses.
Thus, history h =

ω0, aω0 , ω1

will be occasionally written as
h = ω0aω0ω1.
3.3. Conceptual foundations
The fundamental entities in our model are selves. A self is
associated with a particular history—we will thus speak of a ‘self
at history h’. We emphasize that for two fundamental reasons,
it is not sufficient to talk merely about a self at a particular
time period. First, depending on past decisions, either the assets,
information, and circumstances pertaining to the decision, or
the preferences, or even the reasoning capacities of the self
might vary. Second, reasoning about one’s own future behavior
often requires the consideration of off-equilibrium, counterfactual
behavior. Consider, for instance, someone reasoning about the
hot–cold empathy gap (Loewenstein, 2005), and a choice that can
either lead to a ‘hot’, or a ‘cold’ state. Suppose one contemplates
the action that will lead to the ‘cold’ state. Whether this choice is
optimal will depend on the behavior of the future self in the ‘hot’
state, which has different circumstances, preferences, and more
3 The latter is not a restrictive requirement, since it is easy to rewrite a decision
problem on a finite horizon to one on an infinite horizon.limited reasoning capacities than the self in the ‘cold’ state. Thus,
in the context of our paper, it would be inadequate to talk about
a ‘self at time period t ’. Instead, when talking about a self, we will
refer to the history at which that particular self exists.
From a temporal perspective, selves relate both the past, the
present, and the future. Selves are identified by the past sequence
of states and actions. They form beliefs and intentions about the
future. Finally, they have the ability to choose and execute an action
in the present, based on their preferences, beliefs and intentions.4
Wekeep the general assumption that past actions have no effect
on the well-being generated by current and future actions of the
selves, i.e., ‘bygones are bygones’. Each self has full control over her
current actions.5
Using the distinction between experienced utility and decision
utility (Kahneman et al., 1997), we can delimit two senses of
‘expected utility from taking action a’. Let us disregard the
immediate payoff for taking the action, and consider only future
payoffs. In one sense, the phrase could mean ‘experienced utility
from expectation’, i.e., utility that is actually experienced by a
particular self due to expecting a certain stream of future payoffs.
Think of a student that decides to study for an upcoming exam
instead of watching her favorite TV show. She might, in fact,
already enjoy the benefits of the decision to study (she is already
less anxious about the exam, maybe she relishes the idea that
she is doing ‘the right thing’, etc.). The other sense of ‘expected
utility’ could be rendered as ‘the expected present value of various
streams of payoffs’ that the self’s current decision can lead to.
In this sense, the self does not experience any actual change in
utility by choosing one or other course of action; she is merely able
to calculate with these future payoffs. This distinction between
the two senses of expected utility will be used in Section 4, and
in our conceptual interpretations of naiveté and sophistication in
subsequent sections.
3.4. Intentions and beliefs
We aim to give a full description for the two most prevalent
decisionmaker types (naifs and sophisticates) and the hybrid types
that we introduce later. For this purpose, we deal with three
components: the current action, the intended future actions, and
the belief about what future selves will in fact do. There is no
special reason for assuming that the latter two coincide for future
actions, although with our definitions, they coincide for naifs and
sophisticates, but not for hybrid decision makers. To simplify
notation, we reduce this triadic framework to just intentions and
beliefs, and assume that for the current action, these two have to
coincide: No self can be wrong about which action she takes, and
each self takes the action that she intends at that moment.
We emphasize that dealing with both intentions and beliefs is
not standard. In fact, the most common practice is to conflate the
two concepts. Think of backward induction, for instance. When
reasoning about another player, the picture is clear: player 1 forms
beliefs on what player 2 might do, given that they will choose
optimally. However, what about player 1’s future behavior? When
player 1 is rational, expects to stay so, and expects to have no
4 In summarizing the literature on self-control and self-management, Cowen
(1991) identifies a self ‘‘with a set of preferences linked to certain cognitive and
volitional capacities’’.We conceptualize the self along the same lines: In Section 3.4,
we deal with cognitive and volitional capacities, while in Section 4, we discuss
preferences. To refer to the collection of all selves, we use the notion of the decision
maker, and we introduce that level of analysis in Section 3.6.
5 To appreciate that this choice is not so obvious, see Jehiel and Lilico (2010).
Similarly, Elster interprets the Ulysses story in such a way that control over the
current action is essentially eliminated for anyone listening to the sirens (Elster,
1979).
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optimally at future nodes, that is, her intentions and beliefs match.
However, when player 1’s preferences change between the present
and the future, this coherence between beliefs and intentions can
break down: she might want to behave in a certain way in the
future, but cannot reasonably expect to actually do so. Suppose,
for instance, player 1 contemplates whether to visit the pub to
drink two pints in the evening. She knows that her preferenceswill
change after the second pint, and she will want to stay for more.
She intends to drink two pints in the evening, but does not believe
she will actually do so.6
The basic building blocks of our model are all functions from
the set of histories that succeed the present to the set of available
actions at those histories.
Definition 3. The intentions of a self at history h̄ assign an intended
action to each history that succeeds the present:
ih̄ : h ∈ H◃h̄ → Aω(h).
Definition 4. The beliefs of a self at history h̄ assign an action to
each history that succeeds the present:
bh̄ : h ∈ H◃h̄ → Aω(h).
Note that intentions and beliefs are defined at all succeeding
histories, even at those that are not intended to or believed to be
reached by the particular self.
We now proceed to define an intention–belief pair for a
particular self.
Definition 5. An intention–belief pair at history h̄ is a pair of
intentions and beliefs for that self, with the added property that
the belief and intention for the current action coincide:
sh̄ =

ih̄, bh̄

, with ih̄

h̄

= bh̄

h̄

.
The set of all intention–belief pairs for this self is denoted by S h̄.
For a self at h̄, ih̄ (h) refers to the intention, while bh̄ (h) refers to the
belief component of the intention–belief pair sh̄ regarding history
h. For example, bh̄ (h) = a should be read as: ‘the self at h̄ believes
the self at hwill choose action a’.
We can now define stationarity, coherence, as well as consis-
tency for intention–belief pairs.
Definition 6. The intentions (or beliefs) of a self at h̄ are stationary
whenever the intended (believed) actions depend only on the end-
state. Thus, ih̄ or bh̄ is called stationary if, for all h, h′ ∈ H◃h̄
with ω(h) = ω

h′

, we have ih̄ (h) = ih̄

h′

or respectively,
bh̄ (h) = bh̄

h′

. An intention–belief pair sh̄ is stationary if both
its constituent intentions ih̄ and beliefs bh̄ are stationary.
For example, if each day of the week is modeled as a single state,
the intentions of a self who intends to eat in a restaurant every
6 Another illustration is provided by the so-called ‘toxin puzzle’ (Kavka, 1983).
The original formulation is as follows: ‘‘An eccentric billionaire places before you a
vial of toxin that, if you drink it, will make you painfully ill for a day, but will not
threaten your life or have any lasting effects. The billionairewill pay you onemillion
dollars tomorrow morning if, at midnight tonight, you intend to drink the toxin
tomorrow afternoon. He emphasizes that you need not drink the toxin to receive
themoney; in fact, themoneywill already be in your bank account hours before the
time for drinking it arrives, if you succeed. All you have to do is. . . intend atmidnight
tonight to drink the stuff tomorrow afternoon. You are perfectly free to change your
mind after receiving the money and not drink the toxin’’. In this example, I intend
to intend to drink the toxin, but, most likely, I do not believe that I will intend to
drink it.Fig. 1. Stationary intention–belief pairs with intransitive consistency.
second Saturday, and to stay home on every other one, is not
stationary.
Definition 7. A self at h̄ is said to hold a coherent intention–belief
pair, if her intentions and beliefs about future actions coincide for
all future histories. Formally, an intention–belief pair sh̄ = (ih̄, bh̄)
of a self at h̄ is coherent if ih̄(h) = bh̄(h) for all h ∈ H◃h̄.
For example, the intention–belief pair of a self who intends to stop
drinking, but believes she will be unable to do so, is not coherent.
Definition 8. The intention–belief pairs of two selves at h and h′
are said to be consistent if they assign the same intentions and
beliefs to each history that succeeds both selves, i.e., sh and sh
′
are
consistent, if sh

h′′

= sh
′ 
h′′

for all h′′ ∈ H◃h ∩ H◃h
′
.7
For example, an intention–belief pair formulated yesterday
which intended eating apples today and an intention–belief pair
formulated today which intends eating cookies instead are not
consistent.
While coherence concerns the relationship between the inten-
tions and beliefs of the same intention–belief pair, i.e., belonging
to one self, consistency compares intention–belief pairs of two dis-
tinct selves.
A natural question is whether the consistency of inten-
tion–belief pairs is transitive, i.e., whether the consistency of sh and
sh
′
and the consistency of sh
′
and sh
′′
imply that sh and sh
′′
are also
consistent. If h′′ ◃ h′ ◃ h, then this is indeed the case. However,
without this constraint, consistency is not transitive in general—it
is not even transitive within the set of stationary intention–belief
pairs. To see this, take the decision problem in Fig. 1.8 We construct
three stationary intention–belief pairs sρ, sρAτ , and sρA
′σ such that
sρ and sρAτ are consistent, as well as sρAτ and sρA
′σ , but sρ and sρA
′σ
are not consistent. Also, let sρ (ρ) = (A, A), sρ(h) = (B, B) if
ω(h) = τ , and sρ (h) = (C, C) if ω(h) = σ . Intuitively, sρ means:
‘I choose A, believe and intend B in state τ , and believe and in-
tend C in state σ ’. Define two other intention–belief pairs through
sρAτ (h) = (B, B) for all h ◃ (ρ, A, τ ) (‘do B after you reach τ ’),
and sρA
′σ (h) = (C ′, C ′) for all h ◃ (ρ, A′, σ ) (‘do C ′ after you reach
σ ’). All of these intention–belief pairs are stationary. Clearly, sρ and
sρAτ are consistent, since they both require the decision maker to
choose B in state τ , and after history (ρ, A, τ ) no state other than
τ is reachable. Next, sρAτ and sρA
′σ are consistent, since histories
(ρ, A, τ ) and (ρ, A′, σ ) neither succeed, nor precede each other.
But sρ and sρA
′σ are not consistent, as they assign different actions
to the state σ . This shows that consistency of intention–belief pairs
is not transitive on the set of stationary intention–belief pairs.
7 So, if two intention–belief pairs are defined at histories that neither succeed nor
precede each other, then they are consistent, as there are no histories that succeed
both.
8 We use figures like this one to represent decision problems. States are denoted
by Greek characters; in this decision problem, we have states ρ, τ and σ , and
indicates ρ to be the initial state. For actions, we use Roman capitals—in this case,
we have action A, A′ (available in state ρ), B (the only action available in τ ), and
C, C ′ (in σ ). Our examples involve only deterministic transition probabilities, and
the transitions associated with each state are represented by arrows. For example,
for the decision problem in Fig. 1 choosing action C in state σ leads to the state σ
with probability 1.
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The following definitions of ‘truncation’, albeit technical in
nature, are necessary for the definition of a stationary frame.
Truncation formalizes the idea of ‘bygones are bygones’, and chips
away an initial segment of the history.
Definition 9. Take any history h = (ω0, aω0 , . . . , ωt(h)). The
truncation operator ⊣k, defined for any k ≤ t(h), removes the first
k pairs of this sequence, so ⊣k h = (ωk, aωk , . . . , ωt(h)). For a set
of histories H ′ ⊆ H , we refer to the set of k-truncated histories by
⊣k H ′.
Similarly, a truncated intention–belief pair is defined for a self who
‘forgot’ (or disregards) all of her past; future histories obviously
do not include descriptions of forgotten segments of the past
anymore. Thus, the truncated intention–belief pair of a self at h̄will
be defined on the set ⊣t(h̄) H
◃h̄.
Definition 10. For any intention–belief pair sh̄, the truncated
intention–belief pair ⊣ sh̄ : h ∈ ⊣t(h̄) H
◃h̄
→ Aω(h) denotes the
function for which ⊣ sh̄

⊣t(h̄) h

= sh̄(h), for all h ∈ H◃h̄.
We note that while truncated histories are defined for truncations
of arbitrary length (⊣k), for intention–belief pairs we only need
truncations of length t(h̄) for a self at history h̄.
To see this definition at work, think of considering to stop
smoking on the first day of the nextmonth. Take a selfwho resolves
on July 24th: ‘I intend to, and will stop smoking from August 1st’
and then fails. On August 24th, she forms another intention–belief
pair: ‘I intend to, and will stop smoking from September 1st’. It
is easy to see that these intention–belief pairs are not consistent:
For instance, they prescribe different smoking behavior for August
28th—the first intention–belief pair is incompatible with it, while
the second allows it. However, there is an intuitive sense in which
they are very similar. Indeed, theymap them into the same resolve
that uses indexicals instead of precise dates: ‘I may smoke for one
more week, and then I intend to and will stop’.9 Truncating the
present history highlights this similarity by getting rid of the past.
In our example, the original intention–belief pairs are not identical
or consistent; but their truncated versions are identical.
3.6. Frames
We now move from the level of the selves to the level of
the decision maker. Since there is no a priori reason for the
selves to have consistent intention–belief pairs, different selves
can form different intentions and entertain different beliefs about
any certain future self. To have an ‘external’ overview of all selves,
we introduce the concept of a frame. In our terminology, a frame
is an auxiliary tool for representing the intention–belief pairs of
all possible selves. In this way, a frame contains a full description
of the intentions and beliefs under all contingencies, i.e., at all
histories.10
9 Actually, the difference between specifying a future consumption period by
a calendar date or through its temporal distance from the present has already
been noticed by Strotz (1956). This difference is experimentally explored by Read
et al. (2005), finding that subjects only exhibit hyperbolic discounting when future
periods are identified via their temporal distance.
10 It should be noted that the term ‘frame’ is already used in psychology
and behavioral economics, in a different sense. Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
use the term ‘decision frame’ ‘‘to refer to the decision maker’s conception of
the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice’’. To
paraphrase them, we could say we use the term ‘frame of a decision maker’
to refer to ‘‘the analyst’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingenciesFig. 2. A basic decision problem.
Table 1
An example of a frame for the decision problem in Fig. 2.
h ∈ H◃h̄
ρ ρAρ ρA′ρ ρAρAρ ρAρA′ρ · · ·
h̄
ρ A′A′ AA′ AA′ AA A′A′ · · ·
ρAρ – A′A′ – AA′ A′A · · ·
ρA′ρ – – AA – – · · ·
ρAρAρ – – – A′A′ – · · ·
ρAρA′ρ – – – – AA · · ·
· · · – – – – – · · ·
Definition 11. A frame assigns an intention–belief pair to each self.
That is, a frame is a function f : h ∈ H → Sh.
Fig. 2 shows an extremely simple decision problem, for which an
example of a frame is represented in Table 1. Each entry is a pair of
As andA’s, an intended action and a belief about an action. Each row
corresponds to an intention–belief pair for a self at h̄, defining an
intention and a belief for each history that succeeds h̄. For example,
the entry AA′ for row h̄ = (ρAρ) and column h = (ρAρAρ) should
be interpreted as such: The self at (ρAρ) intends to choose action
A at history (ρAρAρ), while believing the self at (ρAρAρ) will, in
fact, choose action A′. The frame thus specifies the intentions and
beliefs of all selves over all other (present and future) selves. Our
definition of an intention–belief pair ensures that on the diagonal
of the table, the intentions and the beliefs match.
We now proceed to introduce three properties of frames. Our
definition of stationarity makes use of the truncation operator
defined above.
Definition 12. A frame f is said to be stationary, if only the end-
state matters when assigning intention–belief pairs to histories,
i.e., for any histories h and h′, if ω(h) = ω

h′

, then ⊣ f (h) = ⊣
f (h′).
Stationarity of a frame is different from the stationarity of the
intention–belief pairs involved. For the decision problem in Fig. 2,
Table 2 offers an example of a non-stationary frame of stationary
intention–belief pairs. To check this, what needs to be verified
first is that each row represents a stationary intention–belief pair.
As there is only one state for this decision problem, this means
that in each row, we should see the same intention–belief pair,
which is indeed the case. Thus, Table 2 shows a frame of stationary
intention–belief pairs. The frame itself however is not stationary:
By truncating the intention–belief pairs in the first and second row,
we get a different intention–belief pair.
On the other hand, Table 3 shows a stationary frame of non-
stationary intention–belief pairs. It is easy to see that it is a frame
of non-stationary intention–belief pairs, as each row represents
one intention–belief pair, which are not stationary—for instance,
(i.e., intentions, beliefs, and actions) associated with a particular decision maker’’.
In the psychological approach to decision making, several frames can be associated
with a single decision problem, whereas we assume that an analyst will have a
single frame of a decisionmaker, the frame describes the decisionmaker’s multiple
selves correctly. There are, of course, many other important differences between
the two meanings of the term. However, such proliferation of meanings does not
necessarily lead to confusion, as long as the context is clear.
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Non-stationary frame of stationary intention–belief pairs.
h ∈ H◃h̄
ρ ρAρ ρA′ρ ρAρAρ ρAρA′ρ · · ·
h̄
ρ AA AA AA AA AA AA
ρAρ – A′A′ – A′A′ A′A′ A′A′
ρA′ρ – – AA – – AA
ρAρAρ – – – AA – AA
ρAρA′ρ – – – – A′A′ A′A′
· · · – – – – – · · ·
Table 3
Stationary frame of non-stationary intention–belief pairs.
h ∈ H◃h̄
ρ ρAρ ρA′ρ ρAρAρ ρAρA′ρ · · ·
h̄
ρ A′A′ AA AA AA AA AA
ρAρ – A′A′ – AA AA AA
ρA′ρ – – A′A′ – – AA
ρAρAρ – – – A′A′ – AA
ρAρA′ρ – – – – A′A′ AA
· · · – – – – – · · ·
sρ(ρ) = (A′, A′) ≠ (A, A) = sρ(ρAρ). The frame itself is stationary,
which can be checked by comparing the rows. As there is only one
state, we need to compare the truncations of all intention–belief
pairs. It can be read from Table 3 that by ‘forgetting the past’, we
get the same intention–belief pair in each row, namely: The self
picks action A′ right away, intends to choose action A, and believes
her future selves will always do so in the future.
For a real-life example of a stationary frame of non-stationary
intention–belief pairs, think of the decisionmaker who, waking up
every day, decides to take just one more shot of heroin, and intends
(as well as believes) to quit the next day.
Next, we define a consistent frame. The intuitive idea is that a
frame is consistent if no deviation can be expected from previous
intentions and beliefs.
Definition 13. A frame f is said to be consistent if the inten-
tion–belief pairs f (h) and f (h′) assigned to any two histories h and
h′ are consistent.
Consistency is a very strong notion. A consistent decision maker
– at whichever history she is contemplating the present and the
future – would never change her mind about any intention–belief
pair. An example would be a heroin user who goes cold turkey
immediately and definitely, never ever restarting her substance
use. If she relapses, she will not be consistent anymore: Her choice
to quit for good implies that at the time of quitting her intentions
and beliefs for the future history at which she relapses do not
match her intentions and beliefs at the point of relapse for the
(then-)current history.
According to this definition, if f is a consistent frame, then we
get f (h)

h′′

= f

h′
 
h′′

whenever h′′ ∈ H◃h ∩ H◃h
′
, and ei-
ther h′ ∈ H◃h, or h ∈ H◃h
′
. Note that, since for a consistent frame,
f (h)(h) = f (h′)(h) for all h′ and h ∈ H◃h
′
; and our requirement
for intention–belief pairs that ih(h) = bh(h), a consistent frame is
necessarily made up by coherent intention–belief pairs. This im-
plies that a choice of an action for all histories uniquely deter-
mines a consistent frame. Similarly, a choice of an action for all
states uniquely determines a consistent frame of stationary inten-
tion–belief pairs.
Theorem 1. A consistent, stationary frame consists of stationary
intention–belief pairs.
Proof. Take any histories h, h′ and h′′ with h′ ◃ h and h′′ ◃ h for
which ω(h′) = ω(h′′). We have to show that f (h)

h′

= f (h)

h′′

.
Fig. 3. Stationary frame of stationary intention–belief pairs is not necessarily
consistent.
For this, see that:
f (h)

h′

= f

h′
 
h′

= ⊣ f

h′
 
⊣t(h′) h′

= ⊣ f

h′′
 
⊣t(h′′) h
′′

= f

h′′
 
h′′

= f (h)

h′′

.
For the respective equations, we use, in order, consistency,
definition of truncation, stationarity of the frame, definition of
truncation, and consistency again. 
Theorem 2. A consistent frame of stationary intention–belief pairs is
a stationary frame.
Proof. Take histories h, h′, h′′, h′′′ with ω(h) = ω

h′

. We have to
show that
(⊣ f (h)) (⊣t(h) h′′) = (⊣ f (h′)) (⊣t(h′) h′′′)
if ⊣t(h) h′′ = ⊣t(h′) h′′′. Note that such h′′ and h′′′ exist, because the
end-states in h and h′ are identical. Using the fact that ω(h′′) =
ω(⊣t(h) h′′) = ω(⊣t(h′) h′′′) = ω(h′′′), we get:
(⊣ f (h)) (⊣t(h) h′′) = f (h)(h′′) = f (h0)(h′′) = f (h0)(h′′′)
= f (h′)(h′′′) = (⊣ f (h′)) (⊣t(h′) h′′′).
We use, in turn, the definitions of truncation, consistency,
stationarity of the intention–belief pair, consistency, and finally,
truncation again. (The root history h0 is one which is surely
succeeded by both h′′ and h′′′.) 
Based on the two theorems above, one might expect that a
stationary frame of stationary intention–belief pairs would be
consistent. However, this is not necessarily so, as can be seen from
the following example. Consider the Markov decision problem in
Fig. 3. For all h ◃ h̄, let:
sh̄1(h) =

(A, A) if ω(h) = ρ,
(B, B) if ω(h) = σ , and
sh̄2(h) =

(A′, A′) if ω(h) = ρ,
(B′, B′) if ω(h) = σ .
Now, let us define a frame f , so that:
f (h̄) =

sh̄1 if ω(h̄) = ρ;
sh̄2 if ω(h̄) = σ .
This is obviously a frame of stationary intention–belief pairs. It also
is a stationary frame, since only the end-state matters in assigning
an intention–belief pair to a history, according to the definition.
However, it is not a consistent frame, since:
f (ρ)(ρAσ) = sρ1 (ρAσ) = (B, B) ≠ (B
′, B′)
= sρAσ2 (ρAσ) = f (ρAσ)(ρAσ).
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We assume that, since each self has control over her current
action (and only that), the actual actions executed by each self h
can be obtained from frame f by looking at f (h)(h), in other words,
from the diagonal of the frame.
Definition 14. The induced intention–belief pair of a frame f
specifies the actual actions chosen by each self:
Λ(f ) : h ∈ H → Aω(h), given by Λ(f )(h) = f (h)(h).
The induced intention–belief pair of the frame represented in
Table 1 is Λ(f )(ρ) = (BB), Λ(f )(ρAρ) = (BB), Λ(f )(ρBρ) = (AA)
etc.
It is handy to define for some frame f , and a self at h̄, the induced
intention–belief pair for the (present and) future:
Λ◃h̄(f ) : h ∈ H◃h̄ → Aω(h), given by Λ◃h̄(f )(h) = f (h)(h);
ΛIh̄(f ) : h ∈ H◃h̄ \ {h̄} → Aω(h), given by
ΛIh̄(f )(h) = f (h)(h).
3.8. Remarks
The considerations of this section highlight the interdepen-
dencies between various concepts. Coherence reflects a match
between intentions and beliefs, desires and reality. In addition,
coherence is a necessary condition for the consistency of frames
(see the discussion immediately preceding Theorem 1). Consis-
tency of a frame ensures that selves are not ‘let down’ by future
selves, in the sense that expected behavior matches actual future
behavior. In various contexts, stationarity of intentions, beliefs, and
stationarity of a frame can also be desirable properties. Primarily,
stationary intentions ‘‘prescribe the simplest form of behavior con-
sistent with rationality’’ (Maskin and Tirole, 2001). Finally, a sta-
tionary frame describes a decision maker who is stable over time.
The language developed here can be helpful for discussing
problems of dynamic inconsistency formulated in the multiple-
self framework, and is independent of the specific assumptions on
utility functions of the next section. In particular, we believe that
our distinction between beliefs/intentions, selves/decision maker,
intention–belief pairs/frame, aswell as ourmethod of representing
frames through tables should prove useful.
4. Utility and discounting
The term payoff, introduced in Definition 1, refers to the imme-
diate gains or losses resulting from an action. Formally, a payoff
gained in period t is denoted by ut , and a stream of payoffs start-
ing at period t by ut→ = (ut , ut+1, . . . , o). We say that a stream of
payoffs ut→ starting at period t coincides with a stream of payoffs
u′t ′→ starting at period t
′ if ut = u′t ′ and ut+1 = u
′
t ′+1, and so on.
Payoffs are fully determined by the decision problem, the
state and the action taken. However, time preference implies that
identical payoffs might be regarded differently by various selves.
Throughout the paper, we make two assumptions on the utility
functions Uh(u) that integrate a stream of future payoffs into a
single number. The first assumption states that Uh is continuous
at infinity for every h, and is adapted from Fudenberg and Levine
(1983).
Assumption 1. Uh is continuous at infinity for every h, i.e., for any
ϵ, there is a horizon Q (h) – possibly depending on h – such that the
total variation of utility after t(h) + Q (h) is less than ϵ:
sup
u,u′
|Uh(u) − Uh(u′)| < ϵ.Another crucial assumption is that selves are identical in the
way they evaluate streams of payoffs, i.e., we assume stationary
preferences (Peleg and Yaari, 1973).
Assumption 2. For any two selves at histories h and h′, and
coinciding streams of payoffs ut(h)→, u′t(h′)→, the utilities of the two
selves are equal, i.e., Uh(ut(h)→) = Uh
′
(u′t(h′)→).
If the utility functions satisfy First and Second Order Separability11
(Lapied and Renault, 2012), then the discount factor for a future
payoff ut can only depend on the time distance t − t(h). In our
examples, we use a discounted utility function of a particular form,
namely, quasi-hyperbolic discounting:
Uh(ut(h)→) = ut(h) + β
∞
t=t(h)+1
δt−t(h) ut ,
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1.
In Section 3.3, we distinguished between two senses of the
term ‘expected utility’: utility actually experienced from expecting
a future payoff stream, and ‘expected utility’ as simply a means of
calculating with various future courses of action. This distinction
is formally nailed down and further refined by the following
definitions.12
Definition 15. The expected utility based on intentions of the
intention–belief pair sh = (ih, bh) for a self at h is:
Uhi

sh

= E

ih
 
Uh

.
The next definition focuses on how much utility a self can
reasonably expect ex ante, whenever making utility calculations:
Definition 16. The expected utility based on beliefs of an inten-
tion–belief pair sh = (ih, bh) for a self at h is:
Uhb

sh

= E

bh
 
Uh

.
Our final definition disregardsmere expectations, and captures the
utility gained by a self considering which actions future selves will
have actually implemented under various eventualities. Using the
notion of an induced intention–belief pair, we can define induced
utility:
Definition 17. Given a frame f , the (ex post) induced utility of the
root self at h0 is:
Ur (f ) = E

Λ◃h0(f )
 
Uh0

.
Notice that traditionally, the above three meanings of the term
‘expected utility’ coincide. The reason is that whenever dynamic
inconsistency does not pose a problem, intentions and beliefs
regarding future actions coincide; moreover, the decision maker
always executes the intentions of past selves.
5. Naiveté
At first sight, it is not even clear whether naiveté is a property
of the decision maker or that of a self. In this and the following
11 First Order Separability means that preferences over a set of outcomes are such
that there is no interaction between the outcomes of various periods. Second Order
Separability allows the isolation of effects of temporal distance.
12 Sáez-Martí and Weibull (2005) connect discounting with altruism towards
future selves. They note that ‘‘[c]urrent welfare or ‘total utility’, so defined, does not
stem only from current instantaneous utility but also from (the anticipation of) the
stream of future instantaneous utilities’’. Our distinction highlights exactly this: Is it
the actual future stream, or the anticipation of that stream that is really important?
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A decision maker will be defined as naive (or sophisticated)
whenever all her multiple selves are naive (or sophisticated).
We introduce hybrid types, and return to our original example
presented in Section 1 after analyzing these base cases.
Naiveté has been characterized in severalways in the literature;
a naif is aware or unaware of different things, depending on the
particular interpretation. A naif is said to:
• choose at each stage an option which seems currently the best
(Strotz, 1956; Hammond, 1976);
• fail to realize that future selves will have different preferences
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a, 2001; Sarafidis, 2004; DellaVi-
gna andMalmendier, 2006; Herings and Rohde, 2006; Heidhues
and Kőszegi, 2009);
• believe that – though her preferences might change – she has
perfect self-control about the future, allowing her to commit
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a, 2001; Gruber and Kőszegi,
2001; Ali, 2011).
It is easy to see that these are genuinely alternative interpretations
of naiveté. A common aspect is that something is amiss with the
beliefs held by the selves. We argue that these troubles arise from
the way the naif determines her beliefs. In particular, for a naive
self, her current preferences determine her intentions, which in
turn determine her beliefs on future actions. Thus, it does not
matter whether a self holds an explicit belief on the lack of change
in her preferences, or whether she believes she will simply fail to
act on such changes, or that she has strong beliefs in her own will-
or pre-commitment power. The essential feature of naiveté is the
sequence of determination presented in Fig. 4.13
Definition 18. An intention–belief pair sh of a self at h is naively
optimal, if it maximizes expected utility based on intentions:
sh ∈ argmax
s∈Sh
Uhi (s) ,
and if it is coherent:
bh

h′

= ih

h′

, for all h′ ∈ H◃h.
A frame f is naively optimal if the intention–belief pair f (h) is
naively optimal at each history h.
Working in a continuous-time discounted utility framework,
Strotz (1956) shows that only when the discount function is
exponential does the decision maker possess a consistent naively
optimal frame for all decision problems. For any non-exponential
discount functions there are decision problems for which there
is no consistent naively optimal frame. However, the existence
of a stationary naively optimal frame is guaranteed under our
assumptions.
Theorem 3. For any decision problem, there exists a stationary
naively optimal frame.
Proof. For each h, the set argmaxs∈Sh Uhi (s) is nonempty, because
the set Sh is nonempty and compact,14 and Uhi is continuous
(Assumption 1). Therefore, the set of intention–belief pairs where
the maximum is in fact reached is nonempty. But note that
the optimality condition in the definition of naively optimal
intention–belief pair only determines the intention component,
and thus, beliefs can be constructed freely. This means that
we can ensure coherence, i.e., we can choose a naively optimal
intention–belief pair at each h.
13 To connect to our discussion in Section 3.3, we can regard the naive as someone
who maximizes expected utility based on intentions; she behaves as if future
expected utility could already be experienced, irrespective of what will actually
happen in the future.
14 See Fudenberg and Levine (1983), p. 261–262 for more details.Fig. 4. The forming of intentions and beliefs by a naive self.
Fig. 5. Multiplicity of induced utility for naively optimal frames.
Now, to guarantee that the generated frame is stationary,
we need to choose the same truncated intention–belief pair for
each set of histories where the end-state is identical. This is
always possible, since whenever the final state is identical for
two histories, both the set of truncated intention–belief pairs
and the utility function defined at those histories are identical
(Assumption 2), and therefore so are the set of truncated optimal
intention–belief pairs. 
Is there a unique stationary naively optimal frame? For a naive
decision maker, this depends on whether for each history, there is
a unique naively optimal intention–belief pair; this latter problem
can be reduced to whether for each state that can be reached, there
is a unique naively optimal intention–belief pair (defined at any
history where the current state is that state). For generic decision
problems, it seems likely that this is indeed the case, though the
scope of the proof is beyond this work. Now, if there is a unique
naively optimal intention–belief pair for each history, then there
is only one naively optimal frame—and it is stationary, too. In
degenerate cases, where multiple naively optimal intention–belief
pairs can be assigned to at least one state, we get stationary
naively optimal frames, along with non-stationary ones. It should
also be noted that – because of the possibility of inconsistency –
multiplicity of naively optimal frames also leads to a multiplicity
of induced utilities.
As an example, consider the decision problem on Fig. 5.15
Discounting is quasi-hyperbolic with β = δ = 0.5. Since naively
optimal intention–belief pairs are by definition coherent, we will
focus on such intention–belief pairs. There are only two histories
where the action choice is not trivial, h0 = (ρ) and h1 = (ρ, A, σ ),
so the naive root self at h0 = (ρ) has to consider only four coherent
intention–belief pairs, which we will denote, by sh0AB, s
h0
AB′ , s
h0
A′B and
sh0A′B′ . They are defined as:
1. sh0AB(h0) = (A, A) and s
h0
AB(h1) = (B, B);
2. sh0AB′(h0) = (A, A) and s
h0
AB′(h1) = (B
′, B′);
3. sh0A′B(h0) = (A
′, A′) and sh0A′B(h1) = (B, B);
4. sh0A′B′(h0) = (A
′, A′) and sh0A′B′(h1) = (B
′, B′).
It can be easily seen that from the perspective of the root self,
Uh0i (s
h0
AB) = U
h0
i (s
h0
A′B) = U
h0
i (s
h0
A′B′) = 0 > −
1
4 =
1
2 ·
1
2 (2−
1
2 ·
3
1
2
) =
Uh0i (s
h0
AB′). Thus, the naive root self is indifferent between choosing
action A first, and B afterwards, or simply A′.
Now we focus on the self at h1. There are two possible
intention–belief pairs, which we will denote by sh1B and s
h1
B′ . They
are determined by:
15 Whenever payoffs are explicit in a figure, the payoff associated with an action
is written in the form A|0, meaning that choosing action A generates a payoff of 0.
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2. sh1B′ (h1) = (B
′, B′).
For the self at h1, U
h1
i (s
h1
B′ ) = 2 −
1
2 ·
1
2 ·
3
1
2
= 0.5 > 0 = Uh1i (s
h1
B ).
Therefore, the naive self at h1 prefers to choose action B′. Now,
consider the two naively optimal frames fA′BB′ and fABB′ , defined as:
• fA′BB′(h0) = s
h0
A′B and fA′BB′(h1) = s
h1
B′ ;
• fABB′(h0) = s
h0
AB and fABB′(h1) = s
h1
B′ .
From the previous calculations, we see that both fA′BB′ and fABB′
are naively optimal frames. However, the induced utilities are not
equal: Ur(fA′BB′) = 0 and Ur(fABB′) = − 14 . The underlying reason
is as follows: The root self at h0 expects to earn 0 both by having
the intention–belief pair sh0A′B or by s
h0
AB. But with s
h0
AB, after getting
to history h1 – on account of being present-biased – she will not
stick to her previous intention–belief pair, which would prescribe
her choosing action B; instead, she chooses B′, which leads to a
decrease in her induced utility.
To finalize our discussion of naiveté: If we interpret an optimal
frame as predictive for a naive decision maker’s behavior, then
for some decision problems, we get a unique prediction of
actions, intentions and beliefs for each history; and we expect
stationary behavior in realization, and a single prediction for the
induced utility. On the other hand, in some cases, we get multiple
predictions of actions, intentions and beliefs for some selves; we
do not necessarily expect stationary behavior; and we do not
necessarily get a unique expectation for induced utility.
6. Sophistication
Similarly to naiveté, there are several definitions of sophistica-
tion:
• optimality under a credibility constraint: following a feasible
optimal plan, or a plan that the decision maker will actually
follow (Strotz, 1956; Yaari, 1978);
• game-theoretic notion: an intra-personal subgame-perfect
equilibrium, sometimes also referred to as ‘Strotz–Pollak
equilibrium’ (Peleg and Yaari, 1973; Kocherlakota, 1996; Vieille
and Weibull, 2009);
• rational expectations: perfectly anticipating future behavior
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001; Gilpatric, 2008);
• self-awareness: being aware of future changes in discount
rates and preferences (Hammond, 1976; Heidhues and Kőszegi,
2009; Ali, 2011).
These definitions donotmatchprecisely. For instance, the notion of
sophistication as an intra-personal equilibrium does not guarantee
the satisfaction of rational expectations in casewhenmultiple such
equilibria exist. In our notation, it is possible that sophisticated
selves at h and h′ with h′ ◃ h each have an intention–belief pair
sh, sh
′
supported by an intra-personal equilibrium, but the action
bh(h′) ≠ bh
′
(h′); that is, sophistication in itself is no guarantee
for consistency. Just like for naiveté, we would like to offer a
new interpretation of sophistication. We regard sophistication as
primarily a characteristic of selves. In our framework, the defining
feature of sophisticated selves is that they first consider their
beliefs about the future, and only then do they form intentions (see
Fig. 6).16
16 A sophisticated self can thus be interpreted as someone who maximizes
expected based on beliefs—on the particular belief that every future self will reason
exactly as she does. She behaves as if future expected utility would merely be
decision utility, and that her actual expected utility in the present would depend
on what will, in fact, happen in the future (cf. 3.3).Fig. 6. The forming of intentions and beliefs by a sophisticated self.
For now, our sophisticated selves assume that all future selves
will be sophisticated, too—wewill relax this assumption for hybrid
selves in Section 7.
A sophisticatedly optimal intention–belief pair ismade up, first,
by beliefs about future selves. A sophisticated self believes each
future self will pick a best response to future selves’ choices. Those
choices will, of course, depend on the beliefs of the respective
future selves. So we implicitly have to consider second-order
beliefs, the beliefs of each self about the beliefs of selves about
the future. To simplify matters, we assume that the second-order
beliefs of a sophisticated self coincidewith her first-order beliefs.17
Thus, the current self believes that future selves will believe what
she currently believes.
The second component of a sophisticatedly optimal inten-
tion–belief pair to consider is the intentions. These are set tomatch
the beliefs. As the sophisticated self knows she has no control over
her future selves, she can just as well intend future actions that fu-
ture selves are choosing anyway.
Finally, the current action is chosen to be a best response to
future actions.
Definition 19. An intention–belief pair sh of a self at h is
sophisticatedly optimal, if:
bh

h′

∈ argmax
a∈A
ω(h′)
Uh
′
b

sh

a : h′

, for all h′ ∈ H◃h,
and if it is coherent:
ih

h′

= bh

h′

, for all h′ ∈ H◃h,
where sh

a : h′

denotes the intention–belief pairwhere the action
taken at h′ – i.e., the intention and belief for history h′ – is replaced
with action a in intention–belief pair sh.18
A frame f is sophisticatedly optimal if the intention–belief pair
f (h) is sophisticatedly optimal at each history h.
One remark about the intention component of a sophisticatedly
optimal intention–belief pairs is in order. It could be argued that
instead of intending to give a best response to future beliefs at h′
basedon thepreferences ath′, the self ath should intend something
else at h′; namely, to give a best response to the choices of future
selves based on the preferences at h, not the ones at h′. However,
we want to guarantee the coherence of sophisticatedly optimal
intention–belief pairs to ensure that a consistent sophisticated
intention–belief pair always exists. Moreover, it is psychologically
plausible that the sophisticated self wants to maintain this
coherence—indeed, this iswhy she is reasoning about future selves,
realizing that the preferences of future selves might be different
from her current ones. We will see in Section 7 that for hybrid
selves intentions and beliefs might not match.
Theorem 4. For any decision problem, there exists a consistent
sophisticatedly optimal frame.
17 O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) make the assumption on second-order beliefs
explicit for partially naive selves.
18 When calculating Uh
′
b

sh

, only the payoffs generated by sh for the histories
succeeding h′ should be taken into account; i.e., we consider the expected utility
induced by sh for the subtree starting at h′ .
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N → H . Although it is not necessary for the proof, we can assume
that the root history is taken first, then all histories at stage 1
are enumerated, then all histories at stage 2, and so on. Let A =
×h∈H Aω(h), where the product is taken in the order according to
e. So, an element a =

ah

h∈H of A prescribes, for every history
h ∈ H , an action ah for the self at h. Take an arbitrary ǎ ∈ A .
Now, for every n ∈ N, we construct an an ∈ A as follows. For
every history h beyond stage n, that is, with t(h) > n, let ahn = ǎ
h.
Then, we proceed by backwards induction. For every history h at
stage n, that is t(h) = n, let ahn be an action for the self at h
that maximizes her utility if all selves that succeed her play the
action according to an (or equivalently, according to ǎ). In general
for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if we have defined ahn for all histories h with
t(h) > k, then for every history h with t(h) = k, we choose ahn to
be an action for the self at h that maximizes her utility if all selves
that succeed her play the action according to an.
So, we obtain a sequence (an)n∈N in the space A . Note that A
with the product topology is compact, and because H is countable,
it ismetrizable too. Consequently, it is sequentially compact,which
implies that the sequence (an)n∈N has a subsequence

ank

k∈N
which converges to some â ∈ A . This means that, for everym ∈ N,
there exists a Km ∈ N such that, for every k ≥ Km, the actions ahnk
and âh coincide for all histories hwith t(h) ≤ m.
Let shn be the intention–belief pair of the self at history h where
the action ah
′
n is intended for all histories h
′ ◃ h, and this self
believes that the same actions will be chosen—that is, a coherent
intention–belief pair. Similarly, we define the intention–belief
pair sh with respect to â. Now consider the frame f that assigns
intention–belief pair sh to the self at h, for every history h.
First, we show that f is consistent. Take any h, h′, the
corresponding intention–belief pairs sh and sh
′
and some history
h′′ with h′′ ◃ h and h′′ ◃ h′. Then
sh

h′′

=

âh
′′
, âh
′′

= sh
′ 
h′′

.
Thus, f is a consistent frame.
We now prove that f is sophisticatedly optimal. For this
purpose, consider an arbitrary self, say at history h, and a self at
a history h′ ◃ h. By construction, for every n ≥ t

h′

, the action ah
′
n
maximizes the utility of the self at h′ if all selves that succeed her
will play the action according to an. Thus,
bhn

h′

= ah
′
n ∈ argmax
a∈A
ω(h′)
Uh
′
b

shn

a : h′

and as we have seen, shn is coherent:
ihn

h′

= bhn

h′

.
By taking the limit along the subsequence (nk)k∈N and using
continuity, we obtain:
bh

h′

= âh
′
∈ argmax
a∈A
ω(h′)
Uh
′
b

sh

a : h′

and
ih

h′

= bh

h′

.
Thus, f is a consistent sophisticatedly optimal frame indeed. 
Again, we might ask whether there is a unique consistent
sophisticatedly optimal frame. It turns out that this is not the
case—it is possible to construct decision problems with multiple
sophisticatedly optimal intention–belief pairs for each history.
Also, the induced utilities of optimal frames can differ. Thus, only
in some cases do we get a unique sophisticatedly optimal frame,
andwith it, unique predictions for a sophisticated decisionmaker’sintention, beliefs, and induced utility.19 For these cases Theorem 4
implies that the frame will be consistent, too.
When allowing only for pure actions, a sophisticatedly optimal
frame of stationary intention–belief pairs might not exist for some,
relatively simple decision problems.While it is natural to associate
naiveté with the lack of stationarity (‘‘I will smoke today, but I
will quit from tomorrow morning’’), the finding that sophisticates
might need to resort to non-stationary intention–belief pairsmight
be somewhat surprising. The implication of this is that it can be too
restrictive to focus only on stationary intention–belief pairs.20
Overall, our understanding of sophistication in terms of so-
phisticated selves first working through their beliefs, then deriv-
ing their intentions is closest to the self-awareness interpretation.
However, sophisticated optimality can indeed be regarded as a
notion of intra-personal subgame-perfection.21 As there might be
several such equilibria, selves at various histories might pick ac-
tions corresponding to different equilibria; thus, there is no a pri-
ori guarantee for the satisfaction of rational expectations, or that
the subgame-perfect equilibrium chosen by the root self will actu-
ally be followed through. Thus, the equilibrium aspect of sophisti-
cated optimality on the level of intention–belief pairsdoes not imply
consistency or stationarity for the sophisticated frame. However,
the above theorem shows that a consistent sophisticatedly optimal
frame exists.
7. Hybrid decision makers
This section introduces a new type of decision maker. So far,
we have only considered decision makers who are either always
naive, or always sophisticated. However, such purity is quite rare,
perhaps even non-existent in the real world. Even the most naive
individual realizes after a while that her intentions might not be
credible; and even the most consistently sophisticated individual
can slip into wishful thinking about her future actions. Therefore,
we try to model this duality of an individual via hybrid types. In
contrast to the partially naifs of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) who
(in the context of quasi-hyperbolic discounting) are aware of future
present-biasedness, but underestimate its magnitude, our hybrid
decisionmaker flip-flops between being sophisticated and naive.22
We now extend our model to capture hybrid types. Our type
space includes naifs and sophisticates.
Definition 20. A Markov decision problem with self types is made
up of:
• the set of time periods {0, 1, 2, . . . , o};
19 On the non-uniqueness of sophisticatedly optimal strategies, see Phelps and
Pollak (1968), Peleg and Yaari (1973) and Blackorby et al. (1973). More recently,
Vieille and Weibull (2009) show that non-uniqueness is a generic property for
hyperbolic discounting, and also give sufficient conditions for uniqueness. For a
refinement concept, see Kocherlakota (1996).
20 This also implies that good advice need not take the law or rulelike form of
‘‘When in X, always do Y!’’, but instead needs to give leeway to either history, or
timing (‘‘When in X, and after having done Z, do Y!’’ or ‘‘When in X on Saturdays, do
Y!’’).
21 This also highlights why in Definition 5 we defined intention–belief pairs for all
future histories, since – as in subgame-perfection – the actions of selves at histories
off the optimal path are relevant.
22 In fact, the classical example of Ulysses and the sirens (Elster, 1979) can be
reinterpreted along similar lines: Ulysses listening to the sirens would not lose all
agency. He would instead (naively and falsely) believe that he can get somewhat
closer to the island of the sirens, and stop at a certain distance. The (sophisticated)
Ulysses that contemplates this situation in advance realizes the song of the sirens
will turn him naive, and ties himself to the mast, preventing his future naive self
from making any choice at all. In contrast, in the standard interpretation, Ulysses
listening to the sirens is not merely naive, but incapable of rational thought, and
thus, choice.
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is the finite type space23; we denote a state-type pair by θ ; the
initial state-type pair is θ0 ∈ Θ; the state component is denoted
by ω(θ); while the type component is denoted by x(θ);
• a finite and nonempty set of pure actions Aω that the decision
maker can choose from in ω;
• a payoff function uω : Aω → R that assigns a payoff to every
action in state ω;
• transition probabilities mθ : Aω(θ) → ∆(Θ), with mθ

θ ′|aω(θ)

denoting the probability to transit from the state-type pair θ to
the state-type pair θ ′ when action aω(θ) is chosen.
This definition keeps the Markovian properties of the original
model, and adds a specification of naiveté or sophistication to each
state. Also, Θ is common knowledge among the selves.
Ourmodel is quite general. Beforemoving on to illustrate its use
in detail for our motivating example from Section 1, we list a few
kinds of decision problems for which it could be used:
• exogenous types: All state-type combinations are allowed (Θ =
Ω × X). Moreover, in each new state, the self is naive (or
sophisticated) with the same probability: mθ ((ω′, x)|aω(θ)) =
mθ ((ω′′, x)|a′ω(θ)) for all θ, ω
′, ω′′, x, aω(θ), a′ω(θ). Such a model
assumes no correlation between state and type.
• fixed type for each state: Here, we have (ω, x), (ω, x′) ∈ Θ ⇒
x = x′. This is the opposite of the previous scenario, as there
is perfect correlation between state and type. It can be easily
seen that any Markov decision problem with self types can
be reformulated in this manner by expanding the state space;
however, it can make the model less illuminating, possibly
hiding structural similarities between the problems faced by a
naive and a sophisticated self.
• deterministic type determination: This requires that for all
θ, aω(θ), there is some x ∈ X , such that

ω′ mθ ((ω
′, x)|aω(θ)) =
1. This means that whatever the self chooses, her type (but not
necessarily her state) in the next period is fully determined.
• full control over type: For all θ, x ∈ X , there is some aω(θ) so
that

ω′ mθ ((ω
′, x)|aω(θ)) = 1. Each self can always determine
the type of the next period self.
Of course, these are boundary cases, and many interesting
situations lie in themiddle, having some, but imperfect correlation
between state and type; and giving some, but less than total
control for selves over their future types. Indeed, it could be
argued that the drinking problemwe present below should involve
stochastic rather than deterministic type determination. However,
for simplicity of analysis, we abstract from such complications.
To understand optimal intention–belief pairs for hybrid selves,
we first have to re-define the notion of history:
Definition 21. A type-dependent history h has the form h =
θ0, aω(θ0), . . . , θt−1, aω(θt−1), θt

, with:
• θi ∈ Θ , for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t};
• aω(θi) ∈ Aωi , for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1};
• mθi

θi+1|aω(θi)

> 0, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}.
Extending the previous notation, x(h) refers to the current type.We
keep the association between histories and selves—each history
now corresponds to a self, and it also includes the self’s type.
Next, we define optimal type-dependent intention–belief pairs
for the Markov decision problem with self types. We make use
of Definitions 18 and 19 for naively and sophisticatedly optimal
intention–belief pairs. We first present the formal definition, and
then explain the intuitions below.
23 N stands for naive, and S for sophisticated.Definition 22. A type-dependent intention–belief pair sh for a
Markov decision problem with self types is optimal at history h, if
it satisfies the following conditions:
• for x(h) = N:
sh ∈ argmax
s∈Sh
Uhi (s) ,
and
bh

h′

= ih

h′

, for all h′ ∈ H◃h
• for x(h) = S:
bh

h′

∈ [argmax
s∈Sh′
Uh
′
i (s)]

h′

,
for all h′ ∈ H◃h with x

h′

= N; 24
bh

h′

∈ argmax
a∈A
ω(h′)
Uh
′
b

sh
′ 
a : h′

,
for all h′ ∈ H◃h with x

h′

= S;
and
ih

h′

∈ argmax
a∈A
ω(h′)
Uh
′
b

sh
′ 
a : h′

,
for all h′ ∈ H◃h with x

h′

= N;
ih

h′

= bh

h′

, for all h′ ∈ H◃h with x

h′

= S.
A type-dependent frame f is optimal, if f (h) is an optimal type-
dependent intention–belief pair for all h.
Although this definition is rather lengthy, it captures our basic
intuitions for the two types. A naive self at h does not reason about
future selves, as her intentions determine her beliefs, and as a
result, herwhole optimal intention–belief pair in the standardway.
However, a sophisticated self at h is able to reason about future
selves in the followingmanner: If a future self ath′ is naive, then the
self at h believes the self at h′ will act in a naive way, maximizing
her expected utility based on intentions. If, on the other hand,
a future self at h′ is sophisticated, then the self at h (correctly)
believes that the self at h′ will act in a sophisticated way, being
able to reason about future selves just as well as h herself does. So
a sophisticated self ath intends to choose in a sophisticatedmanner
at all nodes, giving a best response to the choices of future selves.
This implies that the intention and belief component of an optimal
type-dependent intention–belief pair match for all future histories
where the self is sophisticated, but they might not match with
those of future naive selves. Coherence is therefore not a necessary
property of optimal type-dependent intention–belief pairs.
Naively optimal intention–belief pairs are, in general, not
stationary, and thus the belief component of an optimal type-
dependent frame can also be non-stationary. Moreover, it is easy
to see that such a frame is not consistent: the intentions of
sophisticated selves will not, in general, correspond to the actions
taken by naive selves. In both examples of hybrid decision making
we present below, we will see such inconsistencies.25 The lack
of coherence, stationarity and consistency represent the inner
conflicts that arise within a hybrid decision maker.
24 Technically, [argmaxs∈Sh′ U
h′
i (s)]

h′

is a pair of actions (an intention–belief
pair), whereas bh

h′

is only one action. However, due to Definition 5 – requiring
that the intentions and beliefs of a self at h′ for the action at h′ coincide – it does not
matter which element of the pair is taken.
25 Recall that when an action is actually taken by a self, it is both believed and
intended by the self for the current history.
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optimal frame.
Proof. First, start with determining the intentions and beliefs of
naive selves, i.e., those at histories where x(h) = N . For these, we
can simply use the first part of the proof of Theorem 3. So, we have
sh = (ih, bh) defined for all h with x(h) = N . Let f (h) = sh for all
such h.
Moving now to histories at which the self is sophisticated,
our construction is analogous to that of Theorem 4. Let A =
×h∈H Aω(h), and take an arbitrary a = (ah)h∈H ∈ A that assigns
an action to each history.
Recall that a type-dependent optimal framewill not necessarily
be coherent. Therefore, both intentions and beliefs have to be
constructed;we startwith beliefs. First, transform a into ǎ by fixing
actions assigned to histories where the self is naive, i.e., where
x(h) = N , so that they are actions corresponding to those selves
acting in a naive way:
ǎh = ih(h), if x(h) = N;
ǎh = ah, if x(h) = S.
Let an ∈ A be defined as follows: ahn = ǎ
h for all h with t(h) > n,
or with t(h) ≤ n, and x(h) = N . For the remaining histories with
t(h) ≤ N and x(h) = S, we move by backwards induction from n
to 0, and let ahn be the best response to the future actions, which are
already all defined.
Thus,we obtain a sequence (an)n∈N inA . SinceA is sequentially
compact (see the proof of Theorem 4), the sequence an has a
subsequence ank converging to some â ∈ A .
26 Thus, for all possible
choices of a horizon m, we can find a Km such that âh = ahnk for all
k ≥ Km and hwith t(h) ≤ m.
Now, let the beliefs of a sophisticated self – i.e., at a history h
with x(h) = S – be bh(h′) = âh
′
.
Finally, we construct the intentions of sophisticated selves. Set
sophisticated selves’ beliefs about future nodes as: ih(h′) = bh(h′)
for all h′ with x(h) = x(h′). For sophisticated selves’ intentions
assigned to future naive nodes, we construct ā by modifying â
in a way that whenever x(h) = N , āh is a best response to the
future actions in â.We keep actions at other, sophisticatedhistories
unchanged: ā = â. We set the intentions of a sophisticated self to
be ih(h′) = āh
′
.
We have thus defined both bh and ih for sophisticated selves. Let
sh = (ih, bh) and finally, f (h) = sh for all x(h) = S. This completes
our construction of a type-dependent optimal frame, as we have
provided the intention–belief pairs assigned to histories where the
self is naive, and also to the ones where she is sophisticated.
We will now review our construction again to confirm that f
is indeed a type-dependent optimal frame. For x(h) = N , this is
immediate. For x(h) = S, we will first check the beliefs, and then
the intentions.
First, suppose that x(h′) = N . We have:
bh(h′) = âh
′
= ih
′
(h′) ∈ argmax
s∈Sh′
Uh
′
i (s)(h
′),
which is what is required in the definition of f . For the other case,
take x(h′) = S. Now, from our construction of ah
′
n , for all n ≥ t(h
′):
bhn(h
′) = ah
′
n ∈ argmax
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b (b
h
n[a : h
′
]).
26 There might be multiple subsequences converging to different â-s; in that case,
we can select any one of them.Fig. 7. A drinking problem.
Taking the limit along the subsequence nk, using continuity, we
get:
bh(h′) = ah
′
∈ argmax
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b (b
h
[a : h′]).
For the intentions of sophisticated selves for future sophisticated
nodes, we set these directly to be ih(h′) = bh(h′). The last thing we
need to check is the intentions of sophisticated selves for future
naive selves. These were defined as:
ih(h′) = āh
′
∈ argmax
a∈A
ω(h′)
Uh
′
b (b
h′
[a : h′]). 
Wenow return to the problem raised in the introduction, displayed
in Fig. 7. The decision maker is sitting in a pub, having finished
her second beer (in state ρ), and is of type S (sophisticated). She
can either go home directly by choosing action A, transiting to
state τ , where she does not need to make any more decisions.
Alternatively, she can drink ‘one more beer’ by choosing action B.
This, however, transitions her to a ‘drunken’ state σ , where she
becomes type N (naive). In this drunken state, she can choose
between drinking one more beer by choosing B (thus, maintaining
her drunkenness and staying at σ ), or going home to state τ by
choosing B′.
Let h0 = ((ρ, S)) be the root history. Our goal is to construct sh0 ,
the optimal type-dependent intention–belief pair for the root self
at this history. Since x(h0) = S, we have to dealwith the interesting
case, that of a sophisticated root self.
We start the analysis of this situation by focusing on the state
σ . Take any h′ such thatω(h′) = σ . As x

h′

= N ifω

h′

= σ , we
get bh

h′

∈ argmaxs∈Sh′ U
h′
i (s)

h′

according to the definition;
the root self believes that a self at history h′ with a current state
σ is naive. What is the naive choice in state σ? It is relatively easy
to see that the (subgame-optimal) naively optimal intention–belief
pair is (B, B)(B′, B′)(B′, B′) . . . , i.e., ‘drink one more beer, and then
go home’. Thus, bh0(h′) = B whenever ω(h′) = σ . The root self
thus believes she would continue drinking after becoming naive.
What about the intentions of the root self for the self at σ? She
believes that at history h′, the continuation actions will be B. The
self at history h′ could only choose between B and B′. Going for B
yields 8+ 12 ·
1
2 ·
8
1− 12
= 12, whereas picking B′ gives 0+ 12 ·
1
2 ·
28
1− 12
=
14. Therefore, ih0

h′

= B′ whenever ω(h′) = σ . Together with
the result of the previous paragraph, we get that sh0

h′

= (B′, B)
whenever ω(h′) = σ . We see that the intentions and the beliefs
of the root self do not match: She would like future selves to pick
B′, but correctly anticipates that future selves will be unable to
do so, and would actually choose B. The sober, sophisticated root
self realizes that if she drinks just one more beer, she will end up
drinking much more than what she actually wishes for.
So what should the root self choose at h0? She can pick A, going
home directly, earning herUh0b (s
h0 [A : h0]) = 30+ 12 ·
1
2 ·
28
1− 12
= 44.
Or, she can pick A′, drink one more beer, and end up still being in
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h0 [A′ : h0]) = 38+ 12 ·
1
2 ·
8
1− 12
=
42. Going home seems best. Thus, sh0 (h0) = (A, A). The optimal
type-dependent intention–belief pair is:
sh0(h0) = (A, A),
sh0(h′) = (B′, B), whenever ω

h′

= σ ,
sh0(h′) = (C, C), whenever ω

h′

= τ .
Note that a fully naive root self would expect that she can resist the
temptation of drinking additional bottles of beer, andwould expect
a utility of 38 + 12 ·
1
2 · 0 +
1
2 ·
1
2
2
·
28
1− 12
= 45. The sophisticated
root self realizes that this is unattainable, as the incentives and
the type of the selves change by transiting to σ . So in the drinking
problem, the sober, sophisticated root self avoids becoming naive,
and thus is better off. Sophistication thus can help avoiding the trap
of naiveté. But can sophistication help in avoiding the pitfalls of
sophistication?
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) have shown that in some
decision problems, a naive decisionmaker is strictly better off than
a sophisticated one. The psychological intuition behind this is that
being aware of one’s inability to resist a temptation in the future
can render one unable to resist the temptation in the present, too.
This observation allows us to construct the decision problem in
Fig. 8, which we call the indulgence problem with hybrid type.
The following is an example of the indulgence problem: When
to consume a bottle of valuable wine that gains in quality for up to
three years, but then becomes undrinkable? Should one consume
it immediately (B′), or after one, two, or three years (C ′,D′, or E ′)?
The problem in Fig. 8 complicates this by adding an initial choice of
type: The (sophisticated) root self needs to decide whether to face
the indulgence problem while being sophisticated or naive.
Since she is sophisticated, the root self at history h0 = ((ρ, S))
is able to reason about future selves in the following way:
• At history h1 = ((ρ, S), A, (σ , S)), and at all succeeding
histories, she will be sophisticated. Reasoning by backwards
induction:
– At (σ ′′, S),27 the sophisticated selfwill decide to consume (D′)
rather than wait further (D), because 40 > 36 = 12 ·
1
2 · 144.
– Thus, the sophisticated self at (σ ′, S) will also decide to
consume (C ′) rather than wait (C), because she knows that
thewinewill be consumed in the next period, and 12 > 10 =
1
2 ·
1
2 · 40.
– Along similar lines, at (σ , S) the sophisticated self will again
decide to consume (B′) rather than wait (B), because she
knows that thewinewill be consumed in the next period, and
4 > 3 = 12 ·
1
2 · 12.
– Thus, if the root self decides to face the indulgence problem
while being sophisticated (A), she can expect that the wine
will be consumed immediately afterwards (B′).
• On the other hand, at history h′1 = ((ρ, S), A
′, (σ ,N)), and at all
succeeding histories, she will be naive. We solve the problem of
the naive selves one by one.
– The naive self at (σ ,N) will plan to wait three years,
expecting a utility of 9 =
 1
2
4
· 144, which is more than
waiting two years (5 =
 1
2
3
· 40), one year (3 =
 1
2
2
· 12),
or consuming immediately (4). Therefore, the naive self at
(σ ,N) will choose to wait (B).
27 Since in this decision problem there is a single history reaching each state-type
pair, we will talk about the selves being at a state-type pair, instead of writing out
the full history.Fig. 8. Optimal self-deception in the indulgence problem with hybrid type.
– The naive self at (σ ′,N) will plan to wait two more years,
expecting a utility of 18 =
 1
2
3
· 144, which is more than
waiting one more year (10 =
 1
2
2
· 40), or consuming
immediately (12). Therefore, the naive self at (σ ′,N)will also
choose to wait (C).
– The naive self at (σ ′′,N) will indulge and drink the wine
immediately (D′), gaining 40, which is more than what she
can gain by waiting (D, which yields 36 =
 1
2
2
· 144).
– Thus, if the root self decides to face the indulgence problem
while being naive (A′), she can expect that the wine will be
consumed after two years (D′).
Now, from the perspective of the root self:
Uh0b (s
h0 [A : h0]) =
1
2
·
1
2
· 4 = 1 < 2.5 =
1
2
·

1
2
3
· 40
= Uh0b (s
h0 [A′ : h0]).
Therefore, the best response of the root self is to choose action
A′. Notice that this means that a sophisticated root self chooses to
face the indulgence problem as a naif. Thereby the self at h0 inten-
tionally causes the self at h′1 to havewrong beliefs. In particular, the
naive self at h′1 believes that she will be able to wait until the wine
fully matures, and takes action E ′. The sophisticated self at the pre-
ceding history h0 knows that this is not the case, that in fact, action
D′ will be taken. Thus, when choosing an optimal type-dependent
intention–belief pair, the root self realizes that she is better offwith
false beliefs, and decides to deceive herself.
By what means such self-deception might be effectively
achieved, or whether it can be achieved intentionally at all is, of
course, a difficult problem. But it seems like self-deception has
its virtues, which might, in itself, challenge ethical arguments
on the inherent immorality of self-deception.28 Optimal self-
deception strengthens previous results showing that a decision
maker that cannot commit her consumption plan might optimally
avoid acquiring information, even when learning that information
would be free (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000).
28 For an overview on the philosophical problems of self-deception, see Deweese-
Boyd (2012).
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This work attempts to play a foundational role for future
discourse in multi-self models of dynamic inconsistency. It
establishes that the basic epistemic concepts to be considered are
beliefs and intentions, and the main levels of analysis should be
those of intention–belief pairs and frames. We would now like to
provide some remarks and outline some directions for follow-up
research in this area.
An obvious limitation of the current framework is that it only
allows for pure actions. This limitation is introduced to ease the
presentation, but the technical adaptations required for dealing
with mixed actions can be accomplished rather straightforwardly.
Mixed actions should play a particularly important role when
moving from decision-theoretic models to a game setting.
One might wonder how flexible this model is with regards
to increasing the state or action space of the decision problem.
Countably infinite states and actions can be allowed for without
much difficulty as long as the set of payoffs for each action remains
compact (and hence, bounded). However, handling continuous
time would require a fundamentally different framework, along
with a reinterpretation of the notion of ‘self’.
Whereas our focus was the twomost common types of decision
makers facing dynamic inconsistency, naifs and sophisticates,
there have been arguments in the literature for taking into account
other types as well. In particular, McClennen (1990) argues for
the possibility of resolute decision making. Actually, resoluteness
can easily be incorporated into our framework. Expand the type
space in Markov decision problems with hybrid types to include
resolutes could allow for modeling an even broader class of
phenomena.
The horizon of sophisticated decision makers requires further
investigation. If selves possess only a finite horizon, reasoning
about future selves can be based on two assumptions: Either the
length, or the endpoint of the horizon of that future self is the same
as that of the current self. In the former case, we are talking about
a moving, in the latter, about a fixed horizon. The implications of
these two assumptions on optimal decisions (derived, for instance,
via backward induction) are not yet understood.
Finally, the most interesting application of the framework
presented above will be for game theory. How can players reason
about the intentions and beliefs of other players, as well as
their types? How can one exploit the naiveté (or sophistication)
of others? What kind of equilibria are generated when naive,
sophisticated, or hybrid players are pitted against each other? We
hope that through this work, we have broken the ground for such
questions.
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